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THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE AND
SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE SUITS: A
VIEW FROM THE INSIDE
RICHARD W. DUESENBERG*
I. INTRODUCTION
The term "business judgment rule" is one of those legal abstractions
which take on fresh meaning in new and different situations. While the
rule reaches back many years in American legal history,' it has as-
sumed a new role in the twilight decades of the twentieth century.
These are the years that have witnessed the spate of foreign payments
incidents out of which stemmed not only a series of lawsuits seeking to
recover the value of such payments for corporations, but also stirrings
in Congress,2 in regulatory bodies such as the Securities and Exchange
Commission,' and elsewhere.4 Their common focus was upon the
quality of corporate governance in America.
In the foreign payments lawsuits, the business judgment rule under-
went an ingenious and innovative adaptation. Those corporations that
* Vice President, General Counsel and Secretary, Monsanto Company. B.A., 1951, J.D.
1953, Valparaiso; LL.M, 1956, Yale University. Member of the Missouri Bar Association, Ameri-
can Bar Association and American Law Institute. The author wishes to acknowledge with thanks
the assistance and comments of his colleague, Brian Cunningham.
1. See Prunty, The Shareholders' Derivative Suit: Notes on its Derivation, 32 N.Y.U. L. REv.
980 (1957).
2. Eg., Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified in
scattered portions of 15 U.S.C. § 78 (Supp. IV 1980). Congress adopted this act in December of
1977. The Act prohibits any United States business from, among other things, making payments,
promises of payment, or authorizations of payments of anything of value to any foreign official,
political party, candidate for office, or intermediary for the purpose of inducing the payee to use
its influence with a foreign government or to fail to perform its official functions, to assist in the
obtaining or retaining of business or to influence legislation or regulations.
3. See SEC See. Exch. Act Rel. No. 15,570, 16 SEC DOcKET 1143 (Feb. 15, 1979), relating
to records falsifications and misrepresentations to accountants. See also SENATE COMM. ON
BANKING, HousING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 94TH CONG., 2D SEss., SEC REPORT ON QUESTIONA-
BLE AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES (Comm. Print 1976).
4. The American Bar Association, Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law, was
at the leading edge of constructive reform of corporate practices when it published its Corporate
Director's Guidebook at 32 Bus. LAW. 5 (1976). This was followed by the prestigious Business
Roundtable's position paper adopted early in 1978. See The Role and Composition of the Board of
Directors of the Large Publicly Owned Corporation-Statement of the Business Roundtable, 33 Bus.
LAW. 2083 (1978).
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had officers or directors targeted in lawsuits for return of funds alleg-
edly wrongfully paid out established special committees drawn from
the board of directors to study whether or not the best interests of the
corporation mandated a stockowners' derivative action against such
parties. Typically referred to as special litigation committees, they
were composed of nondefendant directors who along with special
counsel would study the lawsuit, examine papers, documents, and in-
terview persons, and, after careful scrutiny, commonly conclude that
the case was not in the interest of the corporation and should be dis-
missed. The success of this process in a number of celebrated cases5
moved the business judgment rule to center stage in the corporate law
arena.
This Article offers a defense of the rule in its more expansive applica-
tion. Some may feel, as did Kierkegaard, that in defending the faith it
is sometimes betrayed, but the pragmatism of this uniquely common-
law creation is impressive.
II. THE HISTORICAL SETTING
A. Original Contours
The history of the business judgment rule has been examined before
in a number of comprehensive presentations,6 and it is unnecessary to
restate this material in these pages. Nonetheless, some reference to its
background is essential for a perspective on the current debate.
The rule's traditional incantation runs something to this effect: In an
action seeking to impose personal liability on officers and/or directors
5. The first big case associated with questionable payments and involving a litigation com-
mittee was Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). The derivative action sought
recovery by the corporation of $59 million from the directors for illegal payments made to Italian
political parties and politicians from 1963 to 1974. The first state high court decision in this area
was Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979).
6. See, e.g., Prunty, supra note 1. For a complete discussion of the rule in the context of
dismissal of derivative actions, see Block & Prussin, The Business Judgment Rule and Shareholder
Derivative Actions: Viva Zapata?, 37 Bus. LAW. 27 (1981); Coffee & Schwartz, The Survivalofthe
Derivative Suit: An Evaluation and a Proposal/or Legislative Reform, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 261
(1981); Dent, The Power afDirectors to Terminate Shareholder Litigation: The Death of the Deriva-
tive Suit 75 Nw. U. L. REv. 96 (1980). See also Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8
HoFsTRA L. REv. 93 (1979); Arsht & Hinsey, Codfed Standard-Safe Harbor But Charted Chan.
nel- 4 Response, 35 Bus. LAW. 947 (1980); Veasey & Manning, Cod#Fled Standard-Safe Harbor
or Unchartered Ree. An Analysis of the Model Act Standard of Care Compared with Delaware
Law, 35 Bus. LAW. 919 (1980).
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for business decisions, their good faith will be presumed.7 If in fact
their action is found to have been made in good faith and with due
care, a court will not probe the wisdom or merits of the business judg-
ment that was made, and no personal liability will be imposed.8
Underlying this rule is the wisdom of the courts in recognizing that
the administration of a business enterprise necessarily involves making
many business decisions, not all of which will prove successful. Some
should be expected to turn into unmitigated disasters; it does not take a
great deal of searching to come up with instances of corporate business
judgments gone bad. New ventures that never turn profitable, mature
ones that are upset by intervening technologies, and loans and exten-
sions of credit that are never repaid, are familiar fare of business re-
ports. As these words are written, banks around the Western World,
the United States included, are shaken by the prospects of default on
billions of dollars or other currency extended in the form of loans to an
internally troubled East European nation, which in retrospect should
never have been made.9 One purpose of the business judgment rule is
to protect against personal liability for the losses suffered in such
misadventures.' 0
7. Several recent cases challenging board action in resisting unwanted tender offers dramati-
cally evidence the power of this presumption. In Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287 (3d Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981), the court wrote that the business judgment rule validates
certain situations that otherwise would involve a conflict of interest for the ordinary
fiduciary. The rule achieves this purpose by postulating that if actions are arguably
taken for the benefit of the corporation, then the directors are presumed to have been
exercising their sound business judgment rather than responding to any personal
motivations.
Id. at 292.
8. There are many judicial expressions of the rule, a leading one of which is found in War-
shaw v. Calhoun, 43 Del. Ch. 148, 157-58, 221 A.2d 487, 492-93 (Del. 1966), which provides:
In the absence of a showing of bad faith on the part of the directors or of a gross abuse of
discretion the business judgment of the directors will not be interfered with by the
courts.... The acts of directors are presumptively acts taken in good faith and in-
spired for the best interests of the corporation, and a minority stockholder who chal-
lenges their bona fides of purpose has the burden of proof.
Id. (citations omitted).
9. See, e.g., Salamon, Washington Talk of Folirh Loan Default Has Made Western Lenders
Ver, Nervous, Wall St. J., Feb. 5, 1982, at 5, col. 2.
10. An able corporate practitioner has observed:
Even its worst detractors would, I suppose, admit that the fundamental premises un-
derlying the business judgment rule are salutary. Those premises are simply that, as
human beings, directors are not infallible and are not able to please all of the stockhold-
ers all of the time. The first premise recognizes human nature, the second the need to
foster both business and judicial economy by not allowing every corporate transaction to
be subject to judicial review at the request of a disagreeing stockholder.
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Were courts, with perfect retrospective vision, to second-guess the
judgment of officers and directors in their decisionmaking function,
they would be injecting themselves into a management role for which
they were neither trained nor competent. Such judicial action would
also be taking a step to discourage others from performing these de-
sired and essential societal activities." One pragmatic objective of the
business judgment rule, then, is to keep courts out of a role they are ill-
equipped to perform.' 2 Another is to encourage others to assume en-
trepreneurial and risk-taking activities by protecting them against per-
sonal liability when they have performed in good faith and with due
care, however unfortunate the consequence. 13 Both are of monumental
social utility.
One decision that managers and directors of corporations frequently
have to make is whether to pursue certain rights which the corporation
may have against third parties. These may be rights arising under con-
tract, arising as a result of some wrong done to the corporation, or on
some other basis. Not all claims that may be made are pursued. A
myriad of considerations is relevant to a decision whether or not to
press a cause of action against another party, including the probability
of success, probability of recovery and satisfaction of a judgment, cost
of prosecution, effect on continued relations with the other party, and
similar concerns. 14 When a cause against another is not pursued, it
Arsht, supra note 6, at 95. See also Lewis, The Business Judgment Rule and Corporate Directors'
Liabiltyfor Mismanagement, 22 BAYLOR L. REV. 157 (1970).
11. Percey v. Millaudon, 8 Mart. (n.s.) 68 (La. 1829), is often credited as the earliest Ameri-
can judicial expression of the rule. In this case, the court wrote that to reject the rule would
presuppose "the possession, and require the exercise of perfect wisdom in fallible human beings.
No man would undertake to render a service to another on such severe conditions." d. at 77. See
generally Veasey & Manning, supra note 6.
12. As one court stated:
It appears to us that the business judgment doctrine, at least in part, is grounded in the
prudent recognition that courts are ill equipped and infrequently called on to evaluate
what are and must be essentially business judgments. The authority and responsibilities
vested in corporate directors both by statute and decisional law proceed on the assump-
tion that inescapably there can be no available objective standard by which the correct-
ness of every corporate decision may be measured, by the courts or otherwise. Even if
that were not the case, by definition the responsibility for business judgments must rest
with the corporate directors; their individual capabilities and experience peculiarly qual-
ify them for the discharge of that responsibility.
Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 630-31, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 926-27
(1979).
13. See notes 10-11 supra and accompanying text.
14. See, e.g., Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508, 514 n.13 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), where the
court noted the reasons of the special litigation committee for recommending dismissal. These
[Vol. 60:311
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol60/iss2/3
BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE
may be that the shareholders of the corporation will themselves be able
to complain, seeking to enforce the right not on their individual behalf,
but rather derivatively, for the benefit of the corporation. An invention
of courts of equity, this derivative action has as its real beneficiary the
corporation, and not the shareowners. The corporation's rights are the
same as if the corporation itself had maintained the action.1
5
What happens, then, if a shareowner takes issue with a decision of
the corporation not to pursue a claim it has against another party?
That question, and its general answer, have long existed.
The majority of courts has concluded that the business judgment rule
protects a determination of management not to sue, with the result be-
ing that if appropriate procedures are followed, a stockholder's deriva-
tive action pursuing a claim of the corporation will be dismissed.
16
This conclusion follows from the principle that the directors of the cor-
poration are statutorily charged with managing its affairs, and if the
directors determine that prosecution of a claim against another is not
within the corporate interest, that decision is accorded the protection of
the business judgment rule, which operates to abort the shareowner de-
rivative action. Perhaps the most frequently quoted articulation of this
principle is the passage by Justice Brandeis in a case concerning the
enforcement of an antitrust action against competitors, where it was
written:
Whether or not a corporation shall seek to enforce in the courts a cause of
action for damages is, like other business questions, ordinarily a matter of
included the unfavorable prospects for success of the litigation, the cost of the suit, the interrup-
tion of corporate business, and the damage to personnel morale. Similar reasoning was used in
Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 625, 393 N.E.2d 994, 997, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 923 (1979),
where the court noted that none of the accused individuals had violated the required standard of
care or gained personally from the payments, that the actions would likely not succeed, and that if
they were allowed to be prosecuted, the valuable time and talents of management would be
diverted.
15. Liken v. Shaffer, 64 F. Supp. 432, 441 (N.D. Iowa 1946).
16. One of the procedures required of stockholders before they can acquire standing to chal-
lenge the board decision not to sue is to make demand on them that the claim be pursued. This is
designed to afford the board an opportunity to determine what its decision should be. Failing
such a demand, a shareowner may have no derivative action. See Hawes v. City of Oakland, 104
U.S. 450 (1882); Continental Securities Co. v. Belmong, 206 N.Y. 7, 99 N.E. 138 (1912). The
requirement of a demand for standing has some important exceptions, one of which is that it need
not be made if the result is predetermined, as where all directors are implicated in the alleged
wrong. This topic is beyond the scope of this Article. For a discussion of the requirement, see
Comment, The Demand and Standing Requirements in Stockholder Derivative Actions, 44 U. CHI.
L. REv. 168 (1976). See also FED. R. Crv. P. 23.1.
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internal management and is left to the discretion of the directors, in the
absence of instruction by a vote of the stockholders. Courts interfere sel-
dom to control such discretion intra vires the corporation .... 17
Justice Brandeis further explained that the situations in which judi-
cial interference will occur are "where the directors are guilty of mis-
conduct equivalent to a breach of trust, or where they stand in a dual
relation which prevents an unprejudiced exercise of judgment. ... 18
The question of what constitutes an instance of misconduct
equivalent to a breach of trust or standing in a dual relation, such that
the derivative action could go forward even against dissent, has been,
predictably, a matter of much dispute. Usually, these have been either
instances of self dealing 19 or situations in which failure to prosecute or
defend has been regarded as an ultra vires giving away of corporate
assets.20 Aside from these rather narrow factual patterns,2' however,
17. United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261, 263-64 (1917). See
also Corbus v. Alaska Treadwell Gold Mining Co., 187 U.S. 455 (1903), where the court wrote
that "[t]he directors may sometimes properly waive a legal right vested in the corporation in the
belief that its best interests will be promoted by not insisting on such right." Id. at 463. In Swan-
son v. Traer, 249 F.2d 854 (7th Cir. 1957), the court wrote that "an individual stockholder has no
more right to challenge by a derivative suit a decision by the board of directors not to sue than to
so challenge any .other decision by the board." Id. at 859.
18. United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261, 264 (1917). See also
Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288 (1936) where Justice Brandeis stated that: "Courts may not
interfere with the management of the corporation, unless there is bad faith, disregard of the rela-
tive rights of-its members, or other action seriously threatening their property rights." Id. at 343.
After adding that this rule applies also where the claim is a wrongful failure to assert a cause of
action against a third party, he continued: "If a stockholder could compel the officers to enforce
every legal right, courts, instead of chosen officers, would be the arbiters of the corporation's fate."
Id.
19. See, eg., Groel v. United Electric Co., 70 N.J. Eq. 616, 61 A. 1061 (1905).
20. A number of cases have considered failure of directors to press valid claims, or failure to
defend against invalid claims, to amount to an ultra vires giving away of corporate assets. This
view has been taken in cases involving payment of taxes which shareowners alleged were illegal.
For example, in Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. 331 (1856), the directors of a bank, in refusing to take
action to prevent collection of a tax regarded as unconstitutional, cited the obstacles of testing the
laws in the relevant state courts as their reason for not resisting payment. See also Brushaber v.
Union Pacific Ry. Co., 240 U.S. 1 (1916) (federal tax); Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co.,
183 U.S. 79 (1901) (ilegal rate regulation); Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429
(1895) (federal tax). It should be noted that where the payments have not yet been made and the
suit is to enjoin them, the action is distinguishable from those instances where the decision is made
not to pursue a claim that has matured. Arguably, the injunction action is equivalent to an action
to prevent performance of a wrongful act, as distinguished from the act's having already occurred,
and the directors' then having decided not to seek redress of the wrong. The distinction is not
without its significance, since it explains an important digression from the general rule of these
cases that the directors' decision is not challengeable by shareowners, unless it is made in bad faith
or involves self-dealing. See cases cited supra.
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the power to abort the shareowner action to seek redress from third
parties has been formidable.
B. Cases of the 1970s
The above concepts were fairly well in place as the foreign payments
cases and others emerged in the 1970s. Instead of suits against extra-
corporate parties, however, the complaints were aimed at officers and
directors of the corporations on whose behalf the derivative actions
were being instituted. Some courts saw this setting as a variation on the
earlier theme, and concluded that the authority to dismiss the action
against codirectors and officers was but a "natural extension ' 22 of the
earlier established principle. Others saw it differently.
On the side of giving to the board authority to dismiss shareowner
derivative claims against directors and officers is, among others, a trio
of decisions that teach a good deal about the practice of using special
litigation committees. These were Gall v. Exxon Corp.,2  Burks v.
Lasker,24 and Auerbach v. Bennett.25
Taken together, this trilogy announced a series of rules to guide the
disposition of shareowner derivative actions. In Gall,26 a foreign pay-
ment case, the court ruled that a special litigation committee consisting
of one inside director and two outsiders, none of whom was a defend-
ant in the shareowner action, had authority to dismiss the derivative
action. In the absence of allegations of fraud, collusion, self-interest, or
grossly unsound judgment, the court said that such a committee was
21. United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261 (1917); Swanson v.
Traer, 249 F.2d 854 (7th Cir. 1957).
22. Genzer v. Cunningham, 498 F. Supp. 682 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (foreign payments case
against directors and outside accountants).
23. 418 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
24. 441 U.S. 471 (1979) (action against directors). Plaintiffs alleged, among other things, that
the corporation's directors negligently acquiesced in the purchase of worthless Penn Central notes,
and should therefore have been liable for the losses sustained.
25. 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994,419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979). See note 5 supra and accompa-
nying text.
26. In Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), the shareholder sought recov-
ery from directors of $59 million in payments made by a foreign subsidiary to Italian political
parties and politicians. It was asserted that such payments amounted to a wasting of corporate
assets and to mismanagement. The special litigation committee consisted of one inside director
and two outside directors, none of whom were named as defendants or implicated in the alleged
wrong, because they had joined the board after the complained of events. It was also claimed that
failure to disclose these payments in proxy statements was a violation of the Securities Act of 1934.
Id. at 509-14.
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appropriate, and the only concession it made to the plaintiff was to
deny summary judgment for the defendant until the plaintiff had the
opportunity to probe the independence of the special committee
through discovery processes.' The court emphatically declined to ex-
amine the underlying actions complained of, stating that were a court
to embark on such a path, "it would necessarily involve itself in the
business decisions of every corporation, and be required to mediate be-
tween the judgment of the directors and the judgment of the sharehold-
ers with regard to particular corporate actions. '28
After Gall, but only a few weeks before Auerbach, the United States
Supreme Court ruled, in Burks v. Lasker,29 that a two-step analysis is
required in any case involving a federal statute.3° First, the court must
look to state law to determine if the directors are empowered to dismiss
a derivative action against codirectors or officers. 1 If such authority is
concluded to exist, the court next decides whether it should be sus-
pended so as to avoid frustration of any federal policy involved in the
action at hand.32 This was not the first Supreme Court opinion to de-
clare that state law should be examined for identifying the requisite
authority,33 but it is the opinion most responsible for a flurry of new
cases seeking authoritative state law pronouncements.34
Not long thereafter, the first opinion from a state's highest court
came down on the question of whether directors should have authority
to dismiss derivative actions against codirectors. The case was
Auerbach v. Bennett,35 decided by the New York Court of Appeals.
27. 418 F. Supp. at 520. Plaintiff was given 60 days within which to conduct discovery into
issues of the committee's intent, good faith, and motivation. Id.
28. Id. at 519.
29. 441 U.S. 471, 475-86 (1979).
30. Id. at 480. See id. at 478.
31. Id. at 480. See id. at 478.
32. Id. at 480. See id. at 478-79.
33. For an earlier decision, see Swanson v. Traer, 354 U.S. 114 (1957).
34. See, e.g, Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778, 781-83 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
869 (1980); Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724, 728-30 (8th Cir. 1979), cer. denied, 444
U.S. 1017 (1980); Genzer v. Cunningham, 498 F. Supp. 682, 686-89 (E.D. Mich. 1980).
35. 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979). This is one of several cases
involving General Telephone and Electronics Corporation. The foreign payments problem came
to light through an internal audit, following which the audit committee, assisted by distinguished
outside counsel, conducted further investigations. The investigations uncovered evidence of over
$11 million in payments. When the shareholder derivative action was commenced, the board
created a litigation committee of three disinterested directors who had joined the board after the
challenged transactions. The committee was vested with all of the authority of the board to deter-
[Vol. 60:311
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The situation was paradigmatic, in the sense that it contained a variety
of facts: foreign payments; a special litigation committee consisting of
nondefendant directors; use of independent counsel to assist the com-
mittee; defendant directors; and a defendant third party.36 The court
drew no distinction whatsoever between actions against directors and
those in which third parties are the target.37 Rather, the court focused
primarily on what it considered the major issues in the case under a
two-tiered analysis.3"
The first tier focused on the plaintiff's allegation that the corpora-
tion's directors and officers had breached their trust by paying bribes
and kickbacks to foreign governmental customers, as well as customers
that were privately owned. 39 The second tier focused on the issue of
whether the examination and recommendation of the special litigation
committee was thorough and made by members of the board who were
independent and disinterested.' Proceeding under this analysis, the
court concluded "that the determination of the special litigation com-
mittee forecloses further judicial inquiry in this case."4 The court jus-
tified its reluctance to review the judgment of the committee by
asserting that "courts are ill equipped and infrequently called on to
evaluate what are and must be essentially business judgments."4
Therefore, absent a showing of bad faith or fraudulent activity on the
part of the committee (a showing which expressly was not made in this
case),43 the court considered judgments of special litigation committees
to be beyond review. 44 The court took care to emphasize that this busi-
ness judgment rule did not, however, prevent a court from inquiring as
mine the position to be taken by the corporation with respect to the derivative actions. Following
an extensive investigation, the committee found that the outside auditor had not done anything
wrong and that none of the individual defendants had violated the New York due care standard.
It therefore recommended dismissal. Id. at 623-27, 393 N.E.2d at 996-98, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 922-24.
36. Id. at 624-25, 393 N.E.2d at 996-97, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 922-23.
37. The court throughout discussed the assertions of both the director defendants and the
independent accountant-defendant without comment as to the fundamentally different role that
each performed. The special litigation committee ultimately found that Arthur Andersen & Co.
"conducted its examination of the corporation's affairs in accordance with generally accepted au-
diting standards and in good faith . I..." Id  at 625, 393 N.E.2d at 997, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 923.
38. Id. at 630, 393 N.E.2d at 1000, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 926.
39. Id., 393 N.E.2d at 1000, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 926.
40. Id., 393 N.E.2d at 1000, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 926.
41. Id., 393 N.E.2d at 1000, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 926.
42. Id., 393 N.E.2d at 1000, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 926.
43. Id. at 631, 393 N.E.2d at 1001, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 927.
44. Id. at 630, 393 N.E.2d at 1000, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 926.
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to the "disinterested independence"' '45 of the board. Rather, the court
predicated its deference to the committee's decision entirely on the
ability of the committee members to arrive at an independent and dis-
interested judgment.46
TheAuerbach opinion had dramatic effect. Under the two-tier anal-
ysis, the decision of the litigation committee is subject to scrutiny only
to the extent of the good faith and independence of its makers.47 The
court never examines the good faith and due care of the officers and
directors who knew or should have known of the foreign payments. Its
shelter is the shelter given under the business judgment rule to the deci-
sion of the special litigation committee.
The result reached in Auerbach is clearly the correct one. Plaintiff
made no claim that any officer or director personally benefited from the
foreign payments; 48 the payments were made in the interest of the cor-
poration and its shareowners. Millions of dollars were involved. The
end result of denying effect to the litigation committee's recommenda-
tion would very likely have been a long and costly trial, ultimately re-
sulting in protection of the underlying decision via traditional
judgment rule application. Whether a principled distinction should be
made where self-interest on the part of directors or officers is charged in
the underlying action is another question, the one which is presented in
the forays with the Zapata Corporation.
Involved in the Zapata Corporation cases49 was an action by direc-
45. Id., 393 N.E.2d at 1001, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 927.
46. Id. at 630, 393 N.E.2d at 1000, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 926.
47. The court, emphasizing the scope of the business judgment rule, said that the substantive
decision not to sue involved
weighing and balancing of legal," ethical, commercial, promotional, public relations,
fiscal and other factors familiar to the resolution of many if not most corporate
problems .... Inquiry into such matters would go to the very core of the business judg-
ment made by the committee. To permit judicial probing of such issues would be to
emasculate the business judgment doctrine as applied to the actions and determinations
of the special litigation committee.
Id. at 633-34, 393 N.E.2d at 1002, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 928.
48. Id. at 625, 630, 393 N.E.2d at 997, 1000, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 923, 926.
49. The Zapata corporate directors were named as defendants in derivative litigation in three
states as a result of their approving a modification in 1974 to an existing stock option plan. The
plan had been ratified by Zapata shareowners in 1971. As the time for the exercise of final options
approached, the company was planning a tender for over 2 million of its shares, which action was
anticipated to drive the price of the shares from the range of$18-$19 per share to near $25. Aware
that if exercise occurred after the tender, the federal income tax liability of the optionees would be
much greater, the directors amended the plan to accelerate the exercise date to less than a week
before the tender offer. The complaining shareowners claimed that the company lost the benefit
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tors, who were also officers, to amend the company's stock option plan
by allowing acceleration of certain options. This acceleration benefited
the directors at the expense of optimal tax treatment for the corpora-
tion. The company's proxies made no disclosure of this amendment,
and several stockholders became perturbed by the alleged self-dealing
of the directors. The derivative suits resulted. In the lower state court
decision, the court wrote that at least where there is a breach of
fiduciary duty, a shareowner's litigation right is subordinate to the cor-
poration's litigation right "only for so long as the corporation has not
decided to refuse to bring suit."'" The shareowner's right to bring a
derivative action on a claim of breach of fiduciary duty matures as soon
as the corporation refuses to assert the claim. In such a situation, the
of a higher tax deduction, and sued the directors for this loss. Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d
1251, 1254-55 (Del. Ch. 1980), rev'adsub nom. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (1981).
One suit was brought in the Southern District of New York by shareowner Maldonado, Maldo-
nado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), afrd in part and rev'd inpart, [Current] FED.
SEc. L. REp. (CCH) 1 98,457 (2d Cir. Feb. 9, 1982), and another by the same shareowner in the
state courts of Delaware, Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251 (Del. Ch. 1980) rev'd sub non.
Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (1981). The other action was in the southern district of
Texas, by shareowner John Maher, Maher v. Zapata Corp., 490 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. Tex. 1980). In
the New York southern district action, the court said that Delaware law would only require a
showing of independence and disinterest on the part of members of the litigation committee in
order for the directors to initiate a dismissal of a derivative action. 485 F. Supp. at 278. Signifi-
cantly, the court said that the committee did not have to conclude that the derivative action was
without merit in order to recommend dismissal. The court noted that such a finding
is not a prerequisite to the exercise of business judgment though of course it is a factor
that may well be considered. To the contrary, the essence of the business judgment rule
in this context is that directors may freely find that certain meritorious actions are not in
the corporation's best interests to pursue.
Id. at 285.
In the Texas action, the court said that Delaware, which in its Supreme Court had not then had
a business judgment rule case involving a derivative action, would follow the lower Delaware
court to the effect that the rule is purely defensive in scope, and not a basis for dismissing a
derivative action. 490 F. Supp. at 353. It is clear, therefore, that both the Southern District of
New York and the Southern District of Texas were wide of the mark when writing about what the
Delaware law would be.
50. Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251, 1263 (DeL Ch. 1980), rev'dsub nom. Zapata Corp. v.
Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (1981). At another place in the opinion, the court also wrote that
once a stockholder, who asserts a proper cause, has made a demand on the corporation
and has met with refusal, he may assert his individual right and the corporate right
together in a derivative suit, and the corporation no longer controls the corporate right to
which the plaintiffs individual right attaches.
Id. at 1262.
51. Id. at 1263.
52. Id. Obviously, this decision contrasted sharply with that of the Southern District of New
York, where Judge Weinfeld rejected the idea of an individual right of action and predicated the
right to initiate a dismissal on the fact that the cause of action belonged to the corporation and
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shareowner's right to bring the derivative action is considered "primary
and independent. '5 3 The court thus rejected the Auerbach court's posi-
tion that protection of the second-tier decision not to sue under the
business judgment rule precludes any consideration of the first-tier ac-
tion that underlay the shareowner's complaint. Critical to its conclu-
sion was the court's attitude that in derivative actions alleging self-
dealing, "courts and not litigants should decide the merits of litiga-
tion."54 The court stated that aggrieved shareowners were entitled to a
decision by an impartial tribunal, rather than by a committee chosen
by those accused of the wrongdoing. 5
The concept, central to the court's ruling, of a primary and in-
dependent right in the shareholder was so far removed from the main-
stream of American decisions,56 that it did not stand long. On appeal,
the Delaware Supreme Court reversed, 57 saying that although a share-
owner might have the independent right to institute an action, that
right does not include the right to maintain it.58 "We see no inherent
reason," the court wrote, "why the two phases of a derivative suit, the
stockholder's suit to compel the corporation to sue and the corpora-
tion's suit ...should automatically result in the placement in the
hands of the litigating stockholder sole control of the corporate right
throughout the litigation. ' 59 The court worried that such a rule would
place undue weight on the interest of one protagonist "to the exclusion
of all others within the corporate entity." 60
The court then took what it characterized as a "middle course," seek-
ing "to find a balancing point where bona fide stockholder power to
bring corporate causes of action cannot be unfairly trampled on by the
that the only obligation of the court was to judge the independence and disinterest of the director
litigation committee. See note 34 supra. It also rejected ihe contention that under Burks v.
Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979), federal policy precluded the dismissal. 413 A.2d at 1257.
53. Id. at 1263.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. In theory, if the shareowner derivative action is substantively the right of the shareowner,
then nothing that directors do should affect the right to bring the action. As with so many areas of
the law, the distinction between procedural and substantive rights is blurred in these cases, and
arguing the merits of competing opinions on the level of whether the derivative action is one or
the other is not very productive.
57. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
58. Id. at 784-86.
59. Id. at 784-85.
60. Id. at 785.
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board of directors, but the corporation can rid itself of detrimental
litigation."'"
This "balancing point" was expressed in a totally new standard for
the business judgment rule as applied to derivative actions against di-
rectors and officers. It comprised two steps, the first of which is fairly
familiar to traditional articulations of the business judgment rule.62
The second step is another matter. While apparently applicable only in
instances where demand on the board to bring suit is excused,63 the
61. Id. at 787. The court also said that if the board's determination is that a suit would be
detrimental to the company, that determination stands. It prevails even when demand on the
board is excused, if circumstances exist such that continuation of the litigation would not be in the
corporation's best interest. Id. at 785.
62. First, the Court should inquire into the independence and good faith of the commit-
tee and the bases supporting its conclusions. Limited discovery may be ordered to facili-
tate such inquiries. The corporation should have the burden of proving independence,
good faith and a reasonable investigation, rather than presuming independence, good
faith and reasonableness. If the Court determines either that the committee is not in-
dependent or has not shown reasonable bases for its conclusions, or, if the Court is not
satisfied for other reasons relating to the process, including but not limited to the good
faith of the committee, the Court shall deny the corporation's motion.
430 A.2d at 788-89. On who has the burden of going forward with the evidence, or the burden of
proof, see Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979).
63. The Delaware Supreme Court limited its two-step opinion to cases in which demand on a
board to bring action is excused. "Consistent with the purpose of requiring a demand," it wrote,
'a board decision to cause a derivative suit to be dismissed... will be respected unless it was
wrongful .... Absent a wrongful refusal, the stockholder in such a situation simply lacks legal
managerial power." 430 A.2d at 784. Where demand is excused because of board disqualifica-
tion, the court said the situation then "presents a threshold issue." Id. at 784 n.10.
Already, this distinction has prompted judicial challenge. In Abramowitz v. Posner, [Current]
FFD. SEc. L. REp. T 98,458 (2d Cir. Feb. 9, 1982) (2d Cir. 1982), aft'g 513 F. Supp. 120 (S.D.N.Y.
1981), demand was made and refused. The shareowner, joined in an amicus brief by the SEC,
sought to get the court to treat a demand and refusal case as functionally equivalent to a futility
case, but the court declined to go along. Saying that the lower court had correctly required that
demand be made, it then wrote: "While we do not deny that Delaware has chosen a stricter test
for futility cases, we believe that the SEC has misperceived our function as a reviewing court. We
are not a legislative body free to rewrite Delaware law in order to advance federal policy." Id. at
92,695. InAbramowitz, only 5 of 17 directors were made defendants. Had all directors been made
defendants, as in Maldonado, then the second-tier examination under the court's independent
business judgment would have been in order. That was the result reached by the same court in the
appeal of the New York Maldonado case, [Current] FaD. SEC. L. REP. 98,457 (2d Cir. Feb. 9,
1982), afg in part andrev'g inpart, 485 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). See also Stein v. Bailey,
[Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. 98,470 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 1982).
The distinction the Delaware high court has drawn between demand and futility cases is con-
fusing when demand is made and refused, but the facts are such that even if demand had not been
made, the requirement would nevertheless have been excused. That was not the case in
Abramowitz. Demand was made because the lower court required it, and the appellate court
approved of that compulsion. Whether the two-step test of the Delaware Supreme Court could
ever be applied to a demand case was a question explicitly raised but not answered in the Second
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second step substitutes for the business judgment rule the court's own
independent assessment as to whether the action should go forward.64
The court recognized that this independent assessment could well
create situations where the reviewing court, despite its recognition of
the committee's good faith decision not to pursue the action, would
deny the committee's motion to dismiss. 65 The court justified the see-
ond step by stating that its purpose was "to thwart instances where cor-
porate actions meet the criteria of step one, but the result does not
appear to satisfy its spirit, or where corporate actions would simply pre-
maturely terminate a stockholder grievance deserving of further con-
sideration in the corporation's interest."' 66  The court went on to
emphasize that the Court of Chancery would have to determine the
weight of the corporation's interest in dismissal, paying particular at-
tention to offsetting "matters of law and public policy" that might run
counter to the sole question of the best interests of the corporation.67
The exact or even general dimensions of this independent judicial
business judgment are certainly not discernible from the court's lan-
guage. The language, however, is conceivably broad enough so as to
supplant the traditional approach of the business judgment rule applied
to the recommendation of a litigation committee.68
Determination of the intended latitude of this decision will have to
await future cases. Because the words are those of Delaware's highest
court, their import to American corporations is substantial. Further-
more, they can contrast markedly from the approach of the Auerbach
decision.
With this capsulization of the present tensions in American case law
Circuit's opinion. If the two-step test is appropriate for the futility case, however, it is not readily
apparent why it should not apply to a case of demand/refusal where the "disqualification" of the
board tainted the refusal. Presumably, this would require the stockholder to come forward with
specific allegations as to the reasons for that disqualification. The last word on the confusion
wrought by the Delaware court by drawing the distinction has not yet been written.
64. 430 A.2d at 789.
65. Id. For another case interpreting the business judgment rule as allowing directors to
initiate a dismissal of a derivative action and permitting it in a context of self-dealing, see
Abramowitz v. Posner, 513 F. Supp. 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), a'd, [Current] FED. SEc. L. REP.
98.458 (2d Cir. Feb. 9, 1982). In this case, the disinterest and independence of the litigation
committee was defended, and it was noted that the recommendations of the committee included
that of demanding of certain of the defendant directors a refund of personal gains made in breach
of their obligations to the company. Id. at 123, 133.
66. 430 A.2d at 789.
67. Id.
68. See note 125 infra and accompanying text.
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on the business judgment rule in derivative actions in mind, the author
tenders a few observations from inside today's corporate environment.
III. THE DERIVATIVE SUIT AND BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE IN
CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE
Gall, Burks, and Auerbach on the one hand and Maldonado in the
Delaware Chancery Court on the other pull in opposite directions. De-
pending upon the scope to be given to the Delaware Supreme Court's
independent judgment role in Maldonado, the tension between that
opinion and Auerbach, in particular, can also be quite heavy. Either
future decisional law or legislation must resolve this divergence and
bring the later cases closer together. The former course has the impor-
tant attribute of flexible evolution-the utilitarian facility to respond
differently to varying circumstances in a highly fluid environment.
Legislation tends to freeze responses based on the finiteness of circum-
stances as they are known or have been experienced. For either route,
a pragmatic appreciation of the shareowner derivative action is
instructive.
A. The Events Underlying Recent Derivative Actions
The cases of primary focus for this Article, Gall, Burks, Auerbach,
and Maldonado, were all instances of suits against corporate officers
and directors-individuals who were in a fiduciary capacity with their
respective organizations. In some of them, third parties such as an
outside corporate auditor69 were also targets. The plea of this Article,
however, is for an extensive ability of corporate boards to bring to a
close derivative actions against fiduciaries. What is said as to them will
have no less relevance in the context of third party claims, and would
also be equally true if the derivative action were against a lower level
employee.
Many, perhaps the large majority, of the derivative actions that have
helped shape this area of the law during the 1970s and the beginning
years of the new decade involved foreign payments and dealings in a
variety of corporate incentive plans, usually stock options. Both Gall
and Auerbach were overseas payment cases, and Maldonado arose out
of a modification of a stock option program. In Burks, the complaint
was that directors, because they were allegedly not paying due atten-
69. E.g., Aucrbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979).
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tion to their business, acquiesced in the purchase of worthless Penn
Central obligations.
If the foreign payments cases are taken as a group, the reader will
notice that in none of them were the directors implicated in any self-
dealing or improper personal gain. One not unreasonable interpreta-
tion of the conduct of personnel who were familiar with the so-called
overseas bribe activities is that the interests of shareowners were being
pursued over-zealously. All of the bribes involved large sums of
money, and in some it ran into tens of millions of dollars.70 The mag-
nitude of these figures as potential liability on directors for allowing
these payments afforded ample incentive for the judicial response uni-
formly reached, that is, the ability of board committees to initiate a
dismissal of the derivative actions.71
Perhaps the most significant driving force in all of these cases, how-
ever, was the high probability that if the complaint were sent to trial,
protection of the officers and directors under traditional business judg-
ment rule applications would have been forthcoming. Few examples
exist under the business judgment rule when directors have been losers
in a contest over alleged negligence.7" Even in the stock option cases, 73
with their element of self-dealing,74 the business judgment rule would
70. In Gall v. Exxon, 418 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), $59 million was involved. See notes
5 supra & 71 infra and accompanying text.
71. The foreign payments list includes: Gaines v. Haughton, 645 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1981)
($30-$38 million, action dismissed), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3547 (1982) (No. 81-703) (U.S. Jan.
11, 1982); Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979) ($1.38 million, action dis-
missed), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980); Cramer v. General Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 582 F.2d 259
(3d Cir. 1978) (action dismissed), cert denied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1979); Genzer v. Cunningham, 498
F. Supp. 682 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (action dismissed); Rosengarten v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp.,
466 F. Supp. 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) ($3.8 million, action dismissed); Limmer v. General Tel. &
Elecs. Corp., [1977] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,111 (S.D.N.Y.) (action dismissed); Gall v. Ex-
xon, 418 F. Supp. at 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) ($59 million, derivative action dismissed); Parkoff v.
General Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 53 N.Y.2d 412, 425 N.E.2d 820, 442 N.Y.S.2d 432 (1981) (action
dismissed); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979) (over
$11 million, action dismissed); Wechsler v. Exxon Corp., 55 A.D.2d 875, 390 N.Y.S.2d 111 (1977)
(action dismissed).
72. See generally Bishop, Sitting Dueks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the lndemnflcatlon
of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078 (1968).
73. In addition to the Zapata group of cases, note 34 supra, see Galefv. Alexander, 615 F.2d
51 (2d Cir. 1980) (action not dismissed, on basis of federal policy); Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d
778 (9th Cir. 1979) (action withdrawn, but substantial attorney's fee awarded), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 869 (1980).
74. Self-dealing is often said to obviate the availability of the business judgment rule. But
this statement is too sweeping, for examples exist when although an element of self-dealing is
alleged, the rule was applied because of a prevailing corporate purpose in the action taken. See
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probably have afforded a safe harbor. Stock .options are basically a
form of compensation, and courts are reticent to journey into this pre-
serve, leaving to compensation and development committees the re-
sponsibility to determine the corporate interest.75 The cases usually
involved an option program that was amended in some manner to pro-
vide a greater benefit to participants, but at an added cost to the corpo-
ration because of a different but heavier tax treatment. Some dissident
stockholder would call a "foul"76 and seek to recover from directors,
particularly participating insiders, the increased cost to the corporation.
If targeted directors and officers are in the end expected to be suc-
cessful in asserting a business judgment defense, rejecting the board's
recommendation to dismiss and sending the case to trial achieves little.
The time, expense, and other burdens of lengthy litigation prove
counterproductive, clogging already overburdened court calendars and
operating to discourage candidates from assuming directorial roles.
The costs to the corporation, and indirectly to the shareowners as a
whole, can be exorbitant because teams of defense counsel inevitably
become involved. Each named defendant usually receives appropriate
private counsel paid for by the corporation. Because current law holds
that attorneys, even for a losing plaintiff-shareowner, may have a claim
against the corporate treasury,77 the ultimate cost to the entire body of
Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981); Panter v.
Marshall Field & Co., 486 F. Supp. 1168 (N.D. Ill. 1980), aft'd, 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 102 S. Ct. 658 (1981). Both of these are instances of directors resisting unwanted tender
offers, in which plaintiffs made allegations that the directors and officers were interested in the
preservation of their offices. In both cases, the courts upheld the action of directors in using the
business judgment rule defensively. See also Treadway v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357 (2d Cir.
1980).
75. E.g.. Ash v. Brunswick Corp., 405 F. Supp. 234 (D. Del. 1975).
76. The argument usually is that the description of the option plan in the proxy statement
,A as not complete if it did not provide for the type of amendment that was made. Then, if the
amendment was not submitted to shareowners for approval, a violation of the disclosure rules is
alleged. See. e.g., Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 869
S1980), in which the directors of the corporation amended a plan to allow outstanding options to
be turned in for new ones at a much lower price, with the result that on a subsequent rise in the
market price of the company's shares, the optionees received a substantial benefit. The court
adopted the Auerbach rationale enthusiastically, saying that
[t]o allow one shareholder to incapacitate an entire board of directors merely by leveling
charges against them gives too much leverage to dissident shareholders. There is no
reason to believe that a minority shareholder is more likely to act in the best interest of
the corporation than are directors who are elected by a majority of the stockholders.
615 F.2d at 783.
77. Lewis v. Anderson, 509 F. Supp. 232 (C.D. Cal. 1981) (attorney for losing stockholder
sought nearly $400,000 in fees, claiming that dismissed derivative action was catalyst for directors
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stockholders may well outstrip whatever benefit is hoped to be gained
in permitting a challenge to go to trial.
The panoply of malfeasance that derivative actions may attempt to
redress is not, of course, limited to foreign payments and stock option
machinations. As a hypothetical matter, the instances of misconduct
can be much broader. A survey of cases occuring in the 1970s, the
halycon days of the anticorporate activists, discloses other types of
complaints, to be sure, but again in most of these the court confirmed
the power of the board to terminate the action.18 When this did not
occur, independent reasons usually existed to deny effect to a board
recommendation, such as an involvement of the board decision makers
that impaired their disinterest or independence. 9 A few followed the
reasoning of the Chancellor's decision in Maldonado, which, because
of its subsequent reversal, casts those decisions in doubt. Judged by the
cases, one can draw on very little to demonstrate any compelling need
for this remedy against officers and directors to be loosed from the di-
rector authority under which it is currently controlled.8 Instances of
egregious wrong are extremely rare in the cases, 2 and when they have
appeared, the requisite of disinterest or independence has proven suffi-
submitting an amendment of the stock option plan to stockholders for ratification). See also
Neese v. Richer, Jnd. App.__, 428 N.E.2d 36 (1981) (no pecuniary benefit to corporation derived
from dismissed action, but attorney's fees awarded).
78. Joy v. North, 519 F. Supp. 1312 (D. Conn. 1981) (alleging improper and illegal authoriza-
tions of certain construction loans); Issner v. Aldrich, 254 F. Supp. 696 (D. Del. 1966) (stockholder
of company with 50% ownership of subsidiary claimed that joint venturer wrongfully imposed all
risks on the joint venture to profit of only one co-owner); Roberts v. Alabama Power Co., 404
So.2d 629 (Ala. 1981) (alleging wrongful job transfer, improper gratuitous corporate services, and
personal gain); Neese v. Richer, ._Jnd. App._, 428 N.E.2d 36 (1981) (alleging mismanagement
and conversion of corporate funds to personal use).
79. E.g., Clark v. Lomas & Nettleton Fin. Corp., 625 F.2d 49 (5th Cir. 1980) (undue influence
of major shareowner, whose votes were necessary for director election), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1029
(1981); Galefv. Alexander, 615 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1980) (all directors named defendants, and court
also employed federal policy); Watts v. Des Moines Register and Tribune, 525 F. Supp. 1311 (S.D.
Iowa 1981) (following Delaware Supreme Court opinion in Maldonado case in a corporate reor-
ganization designed to discourage unfriendly tender offer).
80. Eg., Abella v. Universal Leaf Tobacco, Inc., 495 F. Supp. 713 (E.D. Va. 1980) (alleged
violation of fiduciary duties in context of tender offer); Maher v. Zapata Corp., 490 F. Supp. 348
(S.D. Tex. 1980) (alleged violation of fiduciary duties in context of proxy statement).
81. Reported case law is not necessarily a barometer for judging a need for law reform, but it
is not irrelevant.
82. Perhaps one of the more focused self-dealing cases is Abramowitz v. Posner, 513 F. Supp.
120 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), at9'd, [Current] FED. SEc. L. REP. 98,458 (2d Cir. Feb. 9, 1982). Here, the
court gave effect to the special litigation committee's recommendation to dismiss, noting that it
had also recommended certain repayments of improper personal gains. Id. at 123, 133. The case
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ciently elastic to achieve the measure of judicial supervision desired.8"
If most or all cases, save for those few bordering on disabling self-
interest, seem to be surviving the recommendation of a board or a
board committee to dismiss a derivative suit, then what need is it that
cries out for a change of direction through either judicial or legislative
action? Little or none. It merits keeping in mind that the per share
compensatory reward of most of these cases is of necessity extremely
small. A recovery in the derivative action belongs not to the shareown-
er, but to the corporation, and, unlike in the formative days of the
shareowners' derivative suit, in today's world the participant in such a
challenge is likely to be a large publicly owned corporation. 4 Even a
huge money recovery will prove inconsequential to most shareown-
ers.85 It may, indeed, be inadequate to cover the cost of such litigation.
Lawyers for the shareowner plaintiffs are in effect lawyers for the cor-
poration, since the derivative action belongs not to the shareowner but
to his corporation. As the "client" of the shareowner's counsel, the cor-
poration is obligated for his fee, oftentimes win, lose, or draw. 6
Shareowners as a group may, when a derivative action survives the
business judgment rule on the underlying claim, nonetheless foot the
costs for losing officers or directors. For some years, corporations have
commonly provided for indemnification of officers, employees, and di-
rectors for liabilities imposed on them as a result of the performance of
their corporate obligations. The precise contours of these indemnifica-
tion provisions, usually found in corporate bylaws approved by share-
owners and often backed up by insurance, 7 vary from institution to
thus illustrates a positive use of this mechanism to achieve correction of abuses and at the same
time avoid the diversions of adversarial litigation.
83. See cases cited note 54 supra. See also Zauber v. Murray Say. Assoc., 591 S.W.2d 932
(Tex. App. 1979).
84. The deep pockets of the large publicly owned corporations make them the targets of
lawsuits. See Getting Into Those Deep Pockets, FoRBEs, Aug. 4, 1980, at 59.
85. The resources of most individuals would not permit satisfaction of a judgment which
would on a per share basis be meaningful in most large publicly owned corporations.
86. Lewis v. Anderson, 509 F. Supp. 232 (C.D. Cal. 1981); Neese v. Richer, .Jnd. App..,
428 N.E.2d 32 (1981). See generally Haudek, The Settlement and Dismissal of Stockholder 4ctions
22 Sw. L.J. 767 (1968).
87. The Monsanto Company bylaw on indemnification of employees, in effect on January 1,
1982, reads in part:
The Company may indemnify, to the full extent permitted by and in accordance with
the laws of the State of Delaware as in effect either at the time of the act or acts com-
plained of or at the time of indemnification, and shall so indemnify to the full extent
required by and in accordance with such laws, any person (and the heirs and legal repre-
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institution, and frequently refer to appropriate state law for the scope
of available coverage."8 This means that two sets of costs conceivably
can be borne by shareowners when derivative actions go forward.
First, they may bear the heavy costs of defending the action on the part
of multiple defendants, each with its team of costly counsel, and sec-
ond, they may bear the funding of indemnification. 89 It is unintelligent
to respond by establishing laws denying the effectiveness of these in-
demnity obligations. In today's litigious environment, exacerbated as it
indeed would be by any severe limitations on the business judgment
doctrine in the derivative action setting, a potential corporate officer or
director would be well nigh irresponsible and foolhardy to accept a
board or senior officer appointment without this protection. The ab-
sence of indemnity would seriously threaten the pool of available direc-
tor talent.
Shareowners' derivative actions are easily as much of interest to en-
trepreneurial lawyers as they are to shareowners,90 and probably more.
If other virtues to derivative suits against officers and directors argue
for their greater availability, then the fact that lawyers should profit
from them is of little relevance. Reported decisions do not demonstrate
the need, however, for greater availability.
sentatives of such person) made or threatened to be made a party to any threatened,
pending, or completed claim, action, suit or proceedings, whether civil, criminal, admin-
istrative or investigative, by reason of the fact that he is or was a Director, officer, em-
ployee or agent of the Company or any constituent corporation absorbed in a
consolidation or merger, or serves or served as such with another corporation, or with a
partnership, joint venture, trust or other enterprise at the request of the Company or any
such constituent corporation.
88. No attempt is made here to describe the scope of indemnity which can be made either
directly by the corporation or from insurance. Delaware distinguishes, in the case of negligence,
between actions of third parties against officers and directors and derivative actions. In the latter
category, indemnification is available only on approval of the court. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 145(a)-(b) (1975). As to the availability of insurance protection that is broader than direct in-
demnity, see id. § 145 (g).
89. The funding may be by way of insurance, or part insurance and part self-insurance.
Whether, in the case of indemnification for a stockholder derivative action judgment, public pol-
icy would preclude the protection is not here discussed. A search for case law on the topic was
fruitless.
90. Once before in its history, the shareowners' derivative suit was in need of protection from
abusive use. See Comment, Securiy for Expenses in Shareholders' Derivative Suits: 23 Years'
Experience, 4 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 50 (1968). See also Hornstein, NewAspects of Stockhold-
ers' Derivative Suits, 47 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1947).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol60/iss2/3
BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE
B. Derivative Suits and Management/Director Motivation
Few would disagree with the observation that contemporary
America is an overly litigious society. A well-known public opinion
researcher and societal commentator observed not long ago that the
propensity and ease with which Americans sue Americans is part of
"the rot in our institutions and infrastructure"'" that must be faced.
Strong words, these are, but they project a warning not to be ignored.
Perhaps the chief victims of this propensity are American corporations
along with their managers and directors.9"
Being on the downside of a litigious society's casus belli would not be
objectionable or inappropriate were the position earned or a useful
purpose served in enduring the agony or the threat thereof. It is often
stated that the shareowners' derivative suit has "long played a crucial
role in assuring a modicum of integrity and competence in the manage-
ment of corporations," 93 or that it is the "chief regulator of corporate
management."94 In a competent and scholarly discourse of this subject,
two academics have opined that "the organizing principle around
which the derivative action should be reconstructed is a deterrent one:
the derivative action should serve as the principal means by which to
enforce the fiduciary duties of corporate officials and to penalize the
violation thereof."9" In this observer's view, nothing is further off base
or potentially more inimical to the interests of corporate governance
and therefore to the welfare of shareowners than this view of the deriv-
ative action.
Lawyers and the legal profession often assign excessive credit to the
9 1. Yankelovich, Towardan Ethic ofCommitment, INDUSTRY WEEK, June 15, 1981, at 62. In
an article published in 1975, Professor John Barton of the Stanford University Law School pro-
jected that in the year 2010 there would be a need for making one million federal appellate deci-
sions. Reporting that number would require 5000 appellate judges in the federal court system
alone. Because for each appellate case in federal courts, historically there have been ten new cases
filed each year, simple projections led to the conclusion that in 2010, in the federal courts alone, 10
million new cases would be filed. Historically, in California the ratio of state to federal filings is 4
to 1, which means in one state of the 50, 40 million suits would be filed per year only one and a
half generations in the future. See Barton, Behind the Legal Explosion, 27 STAN. L. Rav. 567
(1975). It obviously would take an enormously wealthy nation to sustain and endure the expendi-
ture of money and human resources this sort of litigation load would demand.
92. For a provocative treatment of America's propensity for laws and lawsuits, see Manning,
H1fperlexis: Our National Disease, 71 Nw. U.L. Rv. 767 (1977).
93. Dent, supra note 6, at 1.
94. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949).
95. Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 6, at 302.
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value of lawsuits or the threat of lawsuit in shaping the conduct of soci-
ety. No empirical evidence suggests that lawsuits or their threat have
any major impact in keeping others in line. Would lawyers, for exam-
ple, concede that their conduct is determined in any meaningful meas-
ure by the threat of malpractice actions, as distinguished from a
culturally derived attitude to perform in a respectable and professional
manner? Do lawyers put the interests of clients foremost simply to
avoid war with the law or the particular client? The view that share-
owner derivative actions should be used as the "principal means" for
enforcing managerial fiduciary responsibilities reflects either a cynical
view of human action or an uninformed perspective of how manage-
ment works.
Those who manage or guide the management of corporate enter-
prises are, except in the aberrant case, dominantly driven by the desire
to perform effective and superior wealth-producing roles, and to per-
form these in a culturally acceptable manner. They are not motivated
toward proper and effective leadership by the kind of adversarial rela-
tionship or climate that shareowner challenges, especially lawsuits, pre-
cipitate. This is not to say that the threat of potential liability has not
swayed management or board room actions; it doubtless has. The
norm of board and management conduct, however, is to take action
without transgressions of morality and ethics because the ethos and cul-
ture of the participants so demand. To believe that boards and manag-
ers consciously skirt close to the margin of illegality or moral turpitude
to achieve private aggrandizement or gain competitive advantage is to
indulge in fantasy. The real world seldom orders itself in that manner.
Directors and managers of American enterprises are products of the
same culture as are other professionals, including lawyers, judges, and
law professors, and their integrity and sense of justice and injustice are
no less finely tuned, nor more flawed in execution.96
To the business manager, litigation is a nonproductive, highly expen-
sive adversity to be suffered. Its cost is measured not only in dollars,
but also in the injury it brings to organizational morale and the diver-
sion it requires of management time and talent. In view of the disci-
pline forfeited by American courts over the discovery process, it is an
easy matter for opposing lawyers, through depositions, interrogatories,
96. For a discussion of classical concepts of human action, see F. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION
AND LIBERTY (1973).
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and subpoenas of documents, literally to tie in knots a target organiza-
tion. What can be and is done through these tactics belies any rational
justification. Filing lawsuits with little or no merit has become, it
seems, a way of life with many lawyers, nurtured by a number of prac-
tices that managers see as pernicious in consequence. These include
contingency fees, treble damage statutes, and discovery abuses. An-
other contributing factor, and perhaps the more significant, is the fail-
ure of our system to impose a penalty on claimants who are inspired by
counsel to seek draconian relief when an appropriate remedy actually
may be only a fraction of that prayed for, or nothing at all. The over-
deposed, over-interrogated and over-discovered defendant, pursued by
teams of lawyers, becomes victimized by the process, not by the effects
of the allegedly wrongful conduct. Pragmatists as they are, managers
reluctantly turn their attention to settlement, not to avoid adjudication
of their alleged guilt, but to end the process and return their labors to
the ongoing affairs of the entities they are charged to manage. Because
the shareowner-plaintiff is not the recipient of what may be left in any
such settlement after lawyers' fees, the real winner in these forays are
not the shareowners, but the lawyers.
The Gall, Burks, Auerbach lineup offers an effective alternative to
costly and disruptive litigation. In no way do these decisions raise the
specter of an "effectively unrestrained corporate management." 97 By
their own standards they impose a severe limitation: the appropriate-
ness of the process by which a decision is reached.98 Although
Auerbach, the most extreme articulation of the power, suggests a clean
demarcation between a court's examination of the process and its scru-
tiny of the underlying alleged misconduct, it also decrees that the au-
thority to terminate a suit may only be exercised in the lawful and
legitimate furtherance of the corporate purposes.99 The more egregious
the wrong, the less likely is the prospect for success of a board litigation
97. See Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 6, at 265.
98. The power to shut off a derivative action must be exercised under the same guides that
the business judgment rule erected for its defensive use: due care, good faith, and an absence of
gross abuse of discretion. This exercise must be by directors who meet standards of independence
and disinterest. The exact dimensions of these guides may as yet be undetermined, and they may
shift in the course of time, but as measures for judging the independence and objectivity of the
process by which a decision not to sue is made, they have and should continue to have substantial
restraining effect and vitality.
99. Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 629, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 926
(1979).
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committee's recommendation to terminate, even, it may be anticipated,
under Auerbach.
Beyond these constraints on the process itself, a plethora of other
constraints circumscribes corporate management. Almost no decision
of any consequence, from hiring to firing, from embarking on new ven-
tures to exiting old ones, from building new plants to tearing old ones
down, can be made in the executive suite of today's major enterprises
without an in-depth examination of wide-ranging regulations, contract
rights, and business and social pressures, many of which impact or
sometimes totally control the decisionmaking outcome."° Shareowner
actions that are representative rather than derivative are also in the
background,' so that in no manner does enhancement of the board
power to abort derivative actions remove the shareowner as a potential
100. To talk in terms of unrestrained management is simply unrealistic in today's environ-
ment, if it ever was. One need only reflect a moment on the regulatory activities of the SEC,
Department of Labor, Department of Commerce, and the FTC, and such laws as antitrust,
OSHA, Toxic Substances Act, ERISA, and EPA, to mention but a small number, to begin to get
an idea of how hemmed in the business decision-making process has become. Many of these get
repeated at the state and local level.
101. One court stated:
This does not mean, however, that directors may engage in illegal activity with impu-
nity, relying on the prospect that a disinterested committee will seek dismissal on their
behalf. To the contrary, when unlawful acts have been committed, there are other mech-
anisms available to the public or shareholders to enforce any rights infringed as a result
of illegal corporate activities. The government may either prosecute alleged wrongdoers,
which serves the public interest by punishing illegal conduct, or a shareholder may bring
a direct action, which enables those personally harmed by the conduct to seek redress.
These suits are not subject to dismissal at the instance of directors. As such they provide
adequate safeguards against directors who attempt to ratify conduct not capable of
ratification.
Joy v. North, 519 F. Supp. 1312, 1321 (D. Conn. 1981). A similar position was stated in the New
York Maldonado suit, where the court said it is incorrect to imply
that derivative actions are the sole private means of redressing violations of section 14(a)
[of the 1934 Act] and enforcing the Congressional policy of protecting investors. The
cause of action implied under section 14(a), however, can also be asserted by an individ-
ual shareholder in his own behalf or as a class action on behalf of all affected sharehold-
ers and therefore the business judgment rule cannot be said to preclude private
enforcement of the proxy rules.
485 F. Supp. 274, 281 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981), and Panter
v. Marshall Field & Co., 486 F. Supp. 1168 (N.D. Ill. 1980), a'd, 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir), cert.
denied, 102 S. Ct. 658 (1981), are examples of the business judgment rule as applied in shareholder
representative actions. One of the most effective direct actions in the securities area was SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969), in which
liability for nondisclosure of material information was at issue. Also to be borne in mind is the
possibility of criminal actions, as for example, under antitrust proceedings, e.g., United States v.
Foley, 598 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 944 U.S. 1043 (1980), under various environ-
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plaintiff. Rather, it tends more to eliminate the nuisance threat of the
entrepreneurial lawyer than the threat of a claim that validly reflects an
injury directly sustained by shareowners.
Lodging extensive authority in directors to dispose of derivative ac-
tions against officers and other directors is an inherently principled
common law development, serving as it does a central corporate need:
maximum opportunity for effective management of corporate re-
sources. Its enhancement also aids the societal objective of controlling
the litigation explosion, without unduly jeopardizing the protection to
which one of its segments is entitled. Managers and directors, and not
courts, best understand a corporation's need to nurture its business
plans and the best interests of the corporation's diverse constituencies,
most significantly, all of its shareowners and employees. 0 2
C. Compatibility with Corporate Governance
Initially, one might think that assigning the business judgment rule a
role of closing off shareowner derivative actions would run counter to
contemporary currents for corporate governance practices. Certainly,
several commentators have expressed this view, and a few have even
interpreted recent extensions of the rule as sounding the death knell of
the derivative suit.' 3 If, as is the case with some of these writers, the
derivative action is as esteemed as the mechanism by which corporate
management is kept in tow," then its potential decline or demise
would appear to be an event to be regretted."0 5
It seems, however, that one can make a persuasive case that the busi-
ness judgment rule as a device for termination of derivative actions
goes hand in hand with more responsible corporate governance.
mental laws. The potential for criminal actions against business officials has increased substan-
tially in recent years.
102. See Corbus v. Alaska Treadwell Gold Mining Co., 187 U.S. 455 (1903), where the court
wrote: "It is not a trifling thing for a stockholder to attempt to coerce the directors of a corpora-
tion to an act which their judgment does not approve, or to substitute his judgment for theirs." Id.
at 463.
103. See, e.g., Dent, supra note 6, at 98.
104. Whether made by competent scholars, e.g., Rostow, To Whom and For What Ends Is
Corporate Management Responsible?, in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SocIETY 46 (E. Mason
ed. 1961), or iterated from the bench, e.g., Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541
(1949), the mere assertion that the shareowners' derivative action is what keeps corporate boards
and management in line does not make it so. For views on the value of lawsuits in management
conduct, see notes 95-97 supra and accompanying text.
105. See Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 6, at 263; Dent, supra note 6, at 109.
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In an earlier portion of this Article, which traced some of the history
of the business judgment rule, the author noted that since its early ap-
plication in the protection of officers and directors from judicial sec-
ond-guessing, the elements of good faith, due care, and an absence of
gross abuse of discretion had to be satisified in order for this defensive
shield to withstand challenge. 10 6 These requisites also carried over to
instances of board decisions not to pursue claims against third par-
ties 0 7 or against officers and directors. 08
More recently, however, especially in cases involving derivative ac-
tions against officers and directors, the qualities of independence and
disinterest have emerged as pivotal. In this context, the business judg-
ment rule has not been used as a defensive shield, but instead as an
offensive weapon for avoiding attack on the underlying decision.
The logic of employing the business judgment rule in derivative suits
against third parties was, and remains, the judgment that the decision
not to sue is a matter of corporate interest. As such, the decision is one
for management or the board to make in the light of corporate concerns
as the board perceives them, and is therefore no more challengeable by
a shareowner than any other management decision.'0 9 Whether this
logic has equal relevance to derivative actions against officers and di-
rectors is another question. As a distinguished jurist once observed,1 0
law and logic do not always coincide, but rather often are driven apart
by the logic of experience. This undoubtedly underlay the wariness of
the lower Delaware court in the subsequently reversed Maldonado de-
cision, when it wrote that "under our system of law, courts and not
106. E.g., Warshaw v. Calhoun, 43 Del. 148, 221 A.2d 487 (Del. 1966).
107. United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261 (1917).
108. See cases cited at notes 5 & 71 supra. In Joy v. North, 519 F. Supp. 1312 (D. Conn.
1981), the court wrote:
However, once an independent committee has been appointed, the fate of the derivative
suit is no longer in the hands of the defendant directors charged with wrongdoing, but
rather is under the exclusive control of a disinterested committee. The focus thus shifts
from those accused of breach of trust over to the committee members. So long as the
committee consists of directors who are not personally responsible for the breach of trust,
or otherwise involved in the alleged illegality, they have the power, properly exercised, to
absolve those directors claimed to have breached their fiduciary duties.
Id. at 1319.
109. Swanson v. Traer, 249 F.2d 854, 859 (7th Cir. 1957) ("an individual stockholder has no
more right to challenge by a derivative suit a decision by the board of directors not to sue than to
so challenge any other decision by the board").
110. See 0. HOLMEs, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
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litigants should decide the merits of litigation."' I
Logic and experience, however, may well be on the same course in
allowing the business judgment rule to be used to insulate a first-tier
management or board decision from shareowner challenge. With the
elements of due care and good faith firmly intact, and with the impor-
tance of the condition of independence and disinterest on the part of
board litigation committee members equally established, the rule ap-
plied in this context is a catalyst for improved governance practices.
It is probably no mere coincidence that at the same time the business
judgment rule was taking on a new role in derivative actions, signifi-
cant shifts in corporate board supervision were in motion. The decade
of the 1970s brought pronounced moves to more independent outside
board members, and their assignment to significant new oversight func-
tions. As a result, today's typical board of a large publicly owned cor-
poration is predominantly an outside board.1"2 The director
committees created for specific working functions are now highly visi-
ble, and commonly include executive, audit, compensation, nominat-
ing, and, not infrequently, public issues committees. Of these, the audit
committee is composed exclusively of outside members, and the nomi-
nating and compensation groups are heavily weighted in that direction.
These developments are highly compatible with extending the au-
thority of boards to terminate shareowners' derivative actions. The
courts, however, have not failed to notice that an expansion of the au-
thority to close out a derivative action carries within it the seeds of
potential abuse. For that reason, the elements of independence and
disinterest have assumed disproportionate significance. Commentators
and courts alike have debated the issue aggressively.'1 3
Gall and Auerbach were both instances where the special litigation
committee was made up of directors who were not on the board at the
time of the alleged defalcation. Such individuals generally are ac-
corded a presumption of independence and disinterest, unless special
facts are pleaded that show a connection to the event or an interest in
its resolution. InAuerbach, plaintiffs made the argument that no direc-
I11. Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251, 1263 (Del. Ch. 1980).
112. See Mruk & Giardina, Organization & Compensation of Boards of Directors (The Fi-
nancial Executives Institute and Arthur Young & Co. 1981). The same pattern of recent develop-
ment is identified in Heidrick & Struggles, Director Data (1981) and the Eighth Annual Board of
Directors Survey, Korn/Ferry (1981).
113. See, e.g., note 6 supra.
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tor, however detached from the corporation at the time of the event,
can ever be expected to be fully independent because his working rela-
tionship with other directors amounts to a structural bias impacting on
his judgment." 4 The Auerbach court soundly rejected this conten-
tion."' In Maldonado, the Federal District Court for the Southern
District of New York labelled this contention a "cynical attitude" that
would effectively render nugatory any actions undertaken by a board
appointed independent committee." 6
These extracts demonstrate that expectations can and do run high as
to the ability of board members to be independent and disinterested
114. This same skepticism has been expressed in other suits. See, e.g., Burks v. Lasker, 567
F.2d 1208 (2d Cir. 1978), rey'd, 441 U.S. 471 (1979).
115. Ma disqualify the entire board would be to render the corporation powerless to
make an effective business judgment with respect to prosecution of the derivative action.
The possible risk of hesitancy on the part of the members of any committee, even if
composed of outside, independent, disinterested directors, to investigate the activities of
fellow members of the board where personal liability is at stake is an inherent, ines-
capable, given aspect of the corporation's predicament.
47 N.Y.2d at 633, 393 N.E.2d at 1002, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 928. The court added:
To assign responsibility of the dimension here involved to individuals wholly separate
and apart from the board of directors would, except in the most extraordinary circum-
stances, itself be an act of default and breach of the nondelegable fiduciary duty owed by
the members of the board to the corporation and to its shareholders, employees and
creditors. For the courts to preside over such determinations would similarly work an
ouster of the board's fundamental responsibility and authority for corporate
management.
Id. In Joy v. North, 519 F. Supp. 1312 (D. Conn. 1981), when dealing with the structural bias
issue, the court wrote:
No decision which plaintiff has cited to this Court has held that this unique relationship
between defendant directors and the directors they chose to determine the fate of the
derivative suit is grounds, standing alone, either to dissolve the Committee or invalidate
its result. In fact, to take this position would compel this Court to find self-dealing by the
directors even though they followed procedures prescribed by statute and corporate by-
laws in appointing an independent Committee. Moreover, to find these procedures in-
firm and voidable under the statute would place in jeopardy the concept of a litigation
committee at a time when such committees have become widely accepted, useful tools
for disposing of detrimental derivative actions.
Id. at 1321-22. See also Stein v. Bailey, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. 98,470 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4,
1982).
116. The court stated; "This cynical attitude would require a per se disqualification of any
committee appointed by a board exercising its statutory authority no matter how far the independ-
ent committee may be removed from the transactions that are at the core of the litigation." 485 F.
Supp. 274, 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), af'd inpart andrev'dinpart, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
98,457 (2d Cir. Feb. 9, 1982). The shareowner in this case also applied the structural bias argu-
ment to the attorney retained to study the charges, the claim being that since fees would be paid
for the service, an objective independent recommendation would not be forthcoming. The court
dismissed this implication of infirmity as "quite simply, a non sequitur and hardly worthy of
comment." Id. at 283.
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when determining whether an action against their associates should be
continued. The illustrations purposely were drawn from cases where
the members of the litigation committee were chosen after the occur-
rence of the challenged activity. This effectively is the maximum dis-
connection that can be achieved. This is not to suggest, however, that
directors who were on boards when the event complained of took place
cannot satisfy the test of independence and disinterest. They have sat-
isfied the test," 7 as have directors who have been named as nominal
defendants, but of whom no relief was demanded.'18
The interest in these judicial rejections of an inherent incapacity, re-
sulting solely from board membership, is not so much what the courts
stated as their reasons for the rejection, but what they failed to state.
The courts left any satisfied conviction that the deciding board mem-
bers were free of influence from their peers substantially unexpressed;
instead, the conclusion was seen as inescapable if the business judg-
ment rule were to have any vitality in the arena of derivative suits
against board or management.
This silence, however, does not infer that these or other courts, in
applying the business judgment rule to stop derivative actions against
officers and directors, have a subliminal suspicion that freedom from
the influence of peers is an inescapable concomitant of their relation-
ship. The rule is predicated, as previously noted, on the judicial judg-
ment that making this decision involves predominantly business
considerations, the determination of which directors and not courts are
eminently more suited to make.'" 9 Moreover, board members typically
117. E9., Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1017 (1980).
118. E.g., Klotz v. Consolidated Edison Co., 386 F. Supp. 577 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), a case prima-
nly involving claims against extra-corporate parties, in which directors were named nominally
only, but not for purposes of a demanded relief. Accord, Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778 (9th
Cir. 1980); Roberts v. Alabama Power Co., 404 So.2d 629 (Ala. 1981).
119. As between judging the wisdom of dismissing a shareowner derivative action and judging
the merits of the process by which this decision was reached, courts have acknowledged that their
expertise lies in the latter, not former, area. In Auerbach v. Bennett, the court wrote:
As to the methodologies and procedures best suited to the conduct of an investigation of
facts and the determination of legal liability, the courts are well equipped by long and
continuing experience and practice to make determinations. In fact they are better quali-
fied in this regard than are corporate directors in general. Nor do the determinations to
be made in the adoption of procedures partake of the nuances or special perceptions or
comprehensions of business judgment or corporate activities or interests. The question is
solely how appropriately to set about to gather the pertinent data.
47 N.Y.2d at 634, 393 N.E.2d at 1002, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 929. To the same effect is Joy v. North, 519
F. Supp. 1312 (D. Conn. 1981): "Although courts may be ill-equipped to evaluate whether a
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are strong-willed individuals, not easily maneuvered, and quite capable
of identifying when they have a bad situation on hand that requires
unpleasant resolution. 120 Most jurists, it can be presumed, appreciate
this and therefore deem it a wise course to defer to the judgment of
others more knowledgeable about managing the affairs of a business
organization, so long as there are reasonably appropriate safeguards for
the integrity of their decisions.
This debate over the independence and disinterest of board members
identifies the process by which enhancement of the power to close out a
derivative action comes together with improved corporate governance
practices. Obviously, the authority and power to terminate a lawsuit is
an exceedingly useful one, creating as it does a mechanism for avoiding
the risk of potential liability resulting from the merits of the underlying
claims. Far more important to the corporation, however, is the fact
that the power is a helpful tool for preserving within the enterprise
those conditions that are critical to effective, and hopefully profitable,
leadership. Responsible management, recognizing these values, will
take the lead by instituting practices that will improve its opportunity
to invoke the rule, when and if ever needed.' 21 Outside board members
and good oversight practices become important. These will reduce the
probability of events occurring for which a special litigation committee
might be needed, and will thereby improve the prospects for selecting
members for such a committee who will withstand a challenge to their
disinterest or independence. The two contribute to each other an im-
provement in corporate governance and the ultimate extension to
particular derivative suit serves a corporation's best interests, they are well-suited to determine the
bonafides of an independent committee's investigation." Id. at 1325.
120. The structural bias argument relies heavily on the fact that directors are selected with a
good deal of influence, if not total control, by a chief executive officer. The relationship created by
this inhibits, the argument goes, any decision by "outside" directors which would be against the
chief officer or his associates. It seems this argument overlooks the independent qualities that
many directors have, as well as the need for a close relationship between the senior officer and the
board. This relationship is likely to be the closest when the officer is performing well; when this
condition changes, the relationship tends to break down. Thus, as a situation giving rise to share-
owner derivative actions increases in severity or repetitiveness, the reasons for a maverick role
increase and whatever structural bias in the officer's favor there may have been, will likely dimin-
ish. There is a very real limit to the structural bias argument, it seems, and that limit is reached
quickly in difficult situations.
121. In the context of a representative shareowners' action, the appellate court in Panter v.
Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 658 (1981) wrote: "The
presumption of good faith [that] the business judgment rule affords is heightened when the major-
ity of the board consists of independent outside directors." Id. at 294.
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shareowners of the benefits of providing management with an environ-
ment in which to manage effectively.1 2
2
IV. A FINALE: THE FUTURE
Appreciation of the business judgment rule as used in its "offensive"
setting is an innovative response to dispute resolution. In this function,
its utilitarian qualities become apparent. The courtroom is set aside as
the arena where battle must take place, and in its stead is substituted a
mechanism, albeit not flawless, which is calculated to achieve the opti-
mum result for a diverse set of interests.
Although the movement sustained occasional setbacks, the over-
whelming direction of case law, until the Zapata decisions, was toward
a continual aggrandizement of director authority to initiate dismissal of
derivative actions. This, of course, did not occur without some impor-
tant safeguards and qualifications, the most notable of which was em-
phasizing independence and disinterest on the part of the director
decision makers. Two judicial dispositions fairly may be inferred from
these decisions: first, that courts acknowledge the existence of condi-
tions which require close scrutiny to afford reasonable assurance of the
integrity of the process; and second, that rising above these conditions
is a quality possessed by persons other than members of the bench.
Critics of the Auerbach decision question this latter capability. 123 Yet,
board members are learning to disagree more agreeably, and the view
that others cannot be trusted to exercise independent and detached
judgments of their peers properly is criticized as a paralyzing perspec-
tive of human action. 124 Expecting the same degree of objectivity as
would be achieved by a court may be expecting too much, if indeed
122. "The continued willingness of the judiciary to accept its own concept, the business judg-
ment rule, and to apply it to novel and stressful fact situations has to be a tribute to the gains that
have been made in strengthening the role of outside directors." Estes, Corporate Governance in the
Courts, 58 HARV. Bus. REv. 50, 60 (1968).
123. Dent, supra note 6, at 108-09.
124. Commenting on what amounts to disqualifying interest, the court in Joy v. North, 519 F.
Supp. 1312 (D. Conn. 1981), wrote:
So long as directors serving on the Committee lack direct personal involvement in the
subject matter of the suit, they satisfy the threshold test of independence....
To qualify as interested, a Committee member must possess a direct personal stake in
the subject matter being litigated. Personal involvement may take the form of authoriz-
ing the underlying transaction,... holding a financial interest in the conduct at the core
of the litigation .. , or otherwise reaping a tangible benefit from the challenged activity.
Id. at 1326.
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that is necessary. The goal is a decision in the interest of the entity, and
the greater understanding of its needs by those who manage it is a
healthy trade-off for the minimal impact that may flow from a "struc-
tural bias" labored under by a well-chosen body performing its assign-
ment thoroughly and in good faith.
Whether the Delaware Supreme Court's second-step criterion of a
court exercising its own business judgment will undermine this dispute-
resolution use of the business judgment rule is for future cases to deter-
mine. Opinions differ widely, 2 ' and it is too soon to know how lower
courts will respond. 2 6 It is not wholly beyond reason to hope, if not to
125. See Aronoff & Freeman, Shareholder Derivative 4ctions-A Continuing Balancing Effort,
NAT'L L. J., Nov. 16, 1981, at 28, col 1:
inhere is in our judgment no substantial difference between the Delaware Supreme
Court's ruling in Maldonado and the 9th Circuit's decision [in Gaines v. Haughton, 645
F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1981)].
MIaldonado makes clear that the motion to dismiss is "akin to proceedings on sum-
mary judgment." The issue of the independence and good faith of the directors moving
to dismiss, whether or not it is expressly so stated, involves the court in some kind of
inquiry as to whether the wrong claimed to have been done is substantial or insubstan-
tial, or in the court's words whether the stockholder grievance is "deserving of further
consideration in the corporation's interest."
Thus, whether the court states that it is considering the merits of the lawsuit or not, its
decision as to the good faith and the independence of the directors' judgment will require
the court not only to examine the procedure of the independent committee but the nature
of that committee's consideration of the merits of the action and its reasoning as to why
the action should not be allowed to proceed further.
Id. at 28, 30. Compare id with Block & Prussin, supra note 6, at 28, where it is said that the
Delaware Supreme Court's two-stepped ruling will "have far-reaching effects on the way many
derivative actions are fought." These writers also comment:
The problem with the Zapata test is clear on its face: it is so open-ended, so compli-
cated, and so subject to judicial whimsy-which it seems to encourage--that such mo-
tions can never be the simple, inexpensive and straightforward proceedings which a
corporation needs if it is going to eliminate detrimental derivative litigations in a rational
way. Zapata invites endless open-ended pretrial proceedings into such elusive issues as
whether the board's action satisfies the "spirit" of step 1; whether termination would be
"premature" because action is "deserving of further consideration"; whether the corpo-
rate interest is "compelling"; whether the derivative actic n is "nonfrivolous"; and
whether "matters of law and public policy" outweigh the corporate interest.
Id. at 62.
126. The New York Maldonado case was held up on appeal, pending a decision by the Dela-
ware Supreme Court. After that came down, the Second Circuit reversed in part and affirmed in
part the District Court's decision. Settlement of the parallel Texas shareholder action raised the
issue of resjudicata, thus causing reversal. But on sending it back, the Second Circuit said that if
resjudicata did not apply, then the lower court would have "to determine in its own independent
business judgment, whether Zapata's motion to terminate this action should be granted." Maldo-
nado v. Flynn, (Current) FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 198,457, at 92,687 (2d Cir. 1982), a l'g in part
andrev'g inpart 485 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). It gave absolutely no guidance, however, on
how this was to be carried out-what, if any, hearings would be granted, what discovery would be
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol60/iss2/3
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expect, that courts will recognize the utilitarian attributes of the rule
and will be inclined to read the Delaware Supreme Court's choice of
words as unfortunate and confusing. Courts instead should read these
decisions to mean that the good faith, due care, and independent and
disinterested standards required of the rule may be questioned by the
irrationality of any decision that is reached.' 27 Methodology and result
are, after all, never totally detached in any decisionmaking process.
What will be critical to the future viability of the business judgment
rule as used to dismiss derivative actions is that courts do not so en-
cumber the process as to destroy its vitality. Its attributes include the
avoidance of costs in time and attention to business that litigation de-
mands, combined with the speed with which a conclusion can be
reached. The practices currently condoned and allowed when a chal-
lenge of the process is made easily cancel out these benefits. Endless
discovery, shifting of burdens, and other techniques could make the
process cumbersome and costly, and in turn invite claims and litigation
in the expectation of settlement and resulting fees.
Such an error is being made by reporters for the American Law In-
stitute in their first draft of a proposed restatement of Corporate Gov-
ernance principles.'28 Because this document has not yet surfaced in
permitted, who would have the burden of going forward with evidence, burden of proof, or any
other matters.
In the only other case thus far employing the two-tier analysis of the Delaware Supreme Court,
Watts v. Des Moines Register & Tribune Co., 525 F. Supp. 1311 (S.D. Iowa 1981), the court gave
the shareholders a limited 30-day period to conduct discovery in order to challenge the recom-
mendation of the litigation committee. Id. at 1330. It said the committee would have to bear the
burden of the reasonableness of its decision, noting that the committee disregarded the suggestion
of special counsel that one of the derivative claims should go forward. Id. at 1329. But the court
withheld exercising its own business judgment until the discovery process extended to the stock-
holders was completed. Id Thus the case was not instructive as to the substance of the second-
step exercise of business judgment.
127. Eg., Cramer v. General TeL & Elecs. Corp., 582 F.2d 259, 275 (3d Cir. 1978), where the
court wrote that "where the shareholder contends that the directors' judgment is so unwise or
unreasonable as to fall outside the permissible bounds of the directors' sound discretion, a court
should, we think, be able to conduct its own analysis of the reasonableness of that business judg-
ment." See also Gimbel v. Signal Co., Inc., 316 A.2d 599 (Del. Ch.) (involving injunctive action
to prevent sale for $400 million of assets allegedly worth over $700 million), a2fdper curiam, 316
A.2d 619 (Del. 1974).
This position is developed in an article dealing with the scope of the two-step Delaware ruling
to appear in the April, 1982 issue of The Business Lawyer, written by a leading Delaware corpo-
rate practitioner, Norman Veasey.
128. ALI PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE: RESTATEMENT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS (Nov. 1981 Prelim. Draft) (on file with author).
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final form for its maiden presentation to an Institute plenary session,
specific criticism is not appropriate. The draft has, however, caught the
attention of various American Bar Association committees and of the
Business Roundtable. The concerns expressed run deep, questioning
even the wisdom of so prestigious a law organization attempting such a
project. Why? Because of the prospects that it will etch in stone how
corporations are to be managed, and the etching is being done by par-
ticipants who are largely strangers to the task.
On the issue of the business judgment rule used to terminate share-
owner derivative challenges, however, the message of the first draft is
clear: derivative actions are a principal means for achieving responsi-
ble corporate governance and therefore barriers to their dismissal must
be erected and raised high. 29 The draft will not prevail without major
debates. In its present mode it cannot and should not succeed. If it
does, however, it will create another playground for lawyers, probably
obstruct the steady drive for improved corporate governance, 130 and
effectively destroy the means that the genius of the common law cre-
ated for putting in place an effective and equitable decisionmaking al-
ternative to the adversarial environment of the courtroom.
Corporate governance practices have changed dramatically in the
past decade. They continue to evolve, creating an institutional struc-
ture ever more compatible with the authority of directors to initiate
dismissal of derivative actions. The hope is that legal theory will con-
tinue to be responsive and will avoid yet another area of confrontation
that is destructive of the conditions needed for effective managerial
leadership.
129. The ALI Statement imposes significant procedural burdens on corporations seeking to
dismiss a derivative suit, and also makes the suits easier for shareowners to bring. The existing
requirement that shareowners in certain cases post bond to cover the costs of the action to the
corporation is eliminated, and the shareowner is given the right to discovery to acquire informa-
tion to verify its complaint. As to the corporation's litigation committee, the elements of indepen-
dence and disinterest are so altered from current requirements as to make it exceedingly difficult
to establish such a unit from among existing "outside" directors. The authority of a court to
dismiss an action on recommendation of a duly constituted board is also severely restricted.
These provisions currently appear in Part VII of the proposed draft Statement.
130. See notes 103-22 supra and accompanying text.
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